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CLASS ACTIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
MONETARY DAMAGES UNDER FEDERAL RULE

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(b)(2)
NatashaDasani*
INTRODUCTION

What remedies are available to victims of discrimination? Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) was created, in part, to provide class-wide relief
for victims of civil rights discrimination.' While the other provisions of
Rule 23 enable classes to obtain monetary damages, only subsection (b)(2)
enables victims to request injunctive or declaratory relief for the harm they
have sustained. 2 Rule 23(b)(2) enables relief for victims of large-scale civil
rights discrimination, including race and sex discrimination. 3 Additionally,
this provision is often used in cases of discriminatory employment
practices. 4 The central controversy surrounding Rule 23(b)(2) class actions
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Marc Arkin for her guidance and helpful comments.
1. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 advisory committee's note); Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Class Actions §
9.8.1.3 (5th ed. 2002).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The text of this provision of the Rule permits certification
in cases where "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole" is appropriate. Id.
3. See, e.g., 2 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 4:11 n.
20 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Newberg on Class Actions] (describing a number of civil
rights cases based on class-wide discrimination that have been brought under Rule 23(b)(2)).
4. See id. § 4:11 n. 19 (describing cases where employment discrimination class actions
have been brought under Rule 23(b)(2)). See also infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the
circuit split between the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Second Circuits
involving employment discrimination against African-American employees. Employment
discrimination cases are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). See generally Meghan E. Changelo, Note, Reconciling Class
Action Certification with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 36 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 133,
141-58 (2003) (discussing the impact of the Civil Rights Acts on class actions under Rule
23(b)(2)); W. Lyle Stamps, Note, Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind
for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. Pub. L. 411, 412-16 (2003). For a discussion of the
history of employment discrimination class actions under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37
Akron L. Rev. 813, 815-35 (2004). While individuals can bring suits for employment
discrimination, courts are more likely to order institutional or organizational changes in class
actions, where large groups of employees are alleging discrimination on a company-wide
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is whether it is appropriate for courts to permit class certification in cases
where classes request monetary damages in addition to injunctive or
5
declaratory relief.
This Note examines the certification requirements of Rule 23(b)(2),
which governs class actions in which the plaintiffs are seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief.6 Specifically, it seeks to discuss whether monetary
damages are permissible in class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(2).
First, this Note determines how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
be interpreted. To do so, this Note examines the various approaches to
judicial interpretation, attempts to determine the most appropriate approach,
and applies this approach to the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) class-action
lawsuits. Part I discusses the provisions of Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23 in
general, as well as the historical interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) by courts.
Part I also introduces the two main theories of statutory interpretationtextualism and intentionalism-which can be used to determine the optimal
framework to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and
Rule 23(b)(2) in particular. Part II discusses the arguments for interpreting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure using the general principles of
statutory interpretation discussed in Part I. Part II goes on to examine the
arguments concerning the interpretation of the Rules under the two main
approaches to statutory interpretation. Finally, Part III attempts to resolve
this conflict by concluding that incorporating the Advisory Committee's
notes is better than applying the principles of statutory interpretation.
Applying this interpretation to Rule 23(b)(2), this Note concludes that the
Rule allows certification for classes claiming some monetary damages in
addition to injunctive relief.
I. THE CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23(b)(2) AND Two
MAIN THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Part L.A of this Note addresses the specific provisions and the historical
judicial interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) and the Advisory Committee's note
to Rule 23(b)(2). Part I.B introduces two of the main approaches to
statutory interpretation: the modem textualist or plain-meaning view, and
the purposive or intentional approach. Part I.C examines the U.S. Supreme
Court's approach to the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by examining its interpretation of Rule 11.

scale rather than simply an individual experience. See Tristin K. Green, Targeting
Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for InstitutionalReform, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 659,
678-79 (2003).
5. Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding

that monetary damages are only permissible in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions where the
monetary relief is wholly incidental to the injunctive relief requested), with Robinson v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that requests for

monetary relief are permissible for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) as long as the
monetary relief does not predominate over the injunctive relief requested).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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A. Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions
1. Background on Class Actions

In order to maintain a class-action lawsuit, the plaintiff class must satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs class actions. 7 Class actions are useful litigation tools when class
members are "united in interest."8 "The most common method of litigating
claims on behalf of large numbers of individuals," 9 class actions are
governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 Rule 23(a)
imposes the following four requirements for class certification: numerosity,
common questions of law or fact among all members, typicality, and
adequate representation by the named plaintiffs. 1' Provided that all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, 12 the class must then be maintained
under one of the provisions of Rule 23(b) in order for plaintiffs to be
13
eligible to litigate their claims as a class action.
Rule 23(b)(1) allows certification for classes in which "the prosecution of
separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create
a risk of' either "inconsistent or varying adjudications" for class members,
or "adjudications... which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members [not a party to the litigation] or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." 14 Rule 23(b)(3)
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
8. Albert R. Connelly, Class Actions, in The New Federal Class Action Rule 23, 23
(Robert L. Clare ed., 1968).
9. Linda J.Silberman & Allan R. Stein, Civil Procedure: Theory and Practice 897
(2001).
10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The first prerequisite for a class action, "numerosity," refers to
the requirement that "the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). For example, the numerosity requirement was met
in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), where
approximately ten thousand class members were involved. The second requirement is that
"there are questions of law or fact common to the class," since, if the issues of each litigant
are unique, each matter is better litigated on an individual basis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
"Typicality," the third requirement, means that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties [must be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
Finally, the fourth requirement is "adequate representation," meaning that the "representative
parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4). For a discussion of the requirements of Rule 23(a), see generally Gen. Tel. Co. of
the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), and Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches?
Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic Class Actions, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev.
71, 75-76 (2006).
12. See Falcon,457 U.S. at 161 (holding that a class action can only be certified once all
of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied); Pickens, supra note 11, at 75 (stating
that, in Falcon, the U.S. Supreme Court "mandated strict compliance with Rule 23(a)").
13. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). The provisions of 23(b)(1) establish the "limited fund"
class, which occurs when "the defendant has insufficient assets to pay potential legal
liabilities of all potential plaintiffs," and the "prejudice" class, where resolution of the
dispute through individual litigations "would result in a race to the courthouse where the first
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permits certification in cases when "the court finds that the questions of law
or fact that are common to all members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy." 15
2. Provisions of Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) specifically provides for injunctive or declaratory relief for
class members. 16 According to the Advisory Committee's note, Rule
23(b)(2) was created mainly to allow plaintiffs in civil rights cases to
adjudicate their claims, where the primary relief sought is to reverse the
effects of the class-based discrimination, a fact well recognized in case
law. 17 Additionally, the Advisory Committee's note indicates that Rule
23(b)(2) may be used to certify other types of classes seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief, including consumer actions for price discrimination,
actions brought by sellers, medical monitoring in toxic tort cases, or even
antitrust violations brought by patent holders. 18
The text of Rule 23(b)(2) is as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:

case to be decided would effectively decide all other subsequent lawsuits on the same
matter." Stamps, supra note 4, at 415.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Also referred to as the "damage" class, classes certified
under this provision, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), must also
demonstrate "predominance and superiority" and include "notice and opt-out procedures"
that are not necessary for classes certified under (b)(1) or (b)(2). See Stamps, supra note 4, at
415-16. Additionally, in 23(b)(3) classes, non-common issues must be litigated separately.
Id. at 416.
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Injunctive relief generally refers to "a broad range of
conduct that plaintiffs are trying to restrain or mandate" by the defendant. Nat'l Consumer
Law Ctr., supra note 1, § 9.8.1.3. Declaratory relief is usually related to or goes along with
injunctive relief, but can also just be a request for the court to, for example, "declar[e] that a
statute is unconstitutional or that a business practice is unfair ... [which] would have the
effect of 'enjoining' either the enforcement of the statute or the commitment of the offending
practice." Id. § 9.8.1.4 (citation omitted). For an in-depth discussion of the use of
declaratory judgments under Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, see generally Andrew Bradt,
"Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose": Implications of the History of the Declaratory
Judgmentfor the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 767 (2006).
17. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
23 advisory committee's note); Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 1, § 9.8.1.3. The
Advisory Committee's note regarding Rule 23(b)(2) indicates that "[i]llustrative [of this
subsection] are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of
specific enumeration." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note; Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note
1, § 9.8.1.3; see also Timothy E. Eble, The Federal Class Action Practice Manual-Internet
Edition § 24 (1999), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/fcapmanual/chapter4.html (stating
that Rule 23(b)(2) class actions have also been brought for "medical monitoring in toxic tort
cases"). See generally 2 Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 3, § 4:12.
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(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
19
the class as a whole ....

Rule 23(b)(2) is silent as to whether classes so certified may obtain
monetary relief in addition to any injunctive or declaratory relief requested
in the suit.20 At the same time, however, courts have regularly allowed
class members to seek some monetary damages in class-action lawsuits
certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 2 1 Even though the Rule fails to address the
permissibility of monetary damages, the Advisory Committee's note
regarding Rule 23(b)(2) refers to monetary damages. 22 The Advisory
Committee's note to Rule 23(b)(2) states that the "'subdivision does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominately to money damages,"' 23 implying that requests for money
damages may be permitted if they do not predominate over the injunctive or
declaratory relief.
Rule 23(b)(2)'s textual silence as to the permissibility of monetary
damages for classes certified under 23(b)(2) has important ramifications in
the interpretation of the Rule. On the one hand, if silence is treated as
ambiguity, the Court could consider the drafters' intent, which would
seemingly allow for limited monetary damages. 24 On the other hand, if the
Rule's silence is seen as a deliberate omission on the part of the drafters, no
monetary damages would be allowed for class actions certified under
25
23(b)(2).
3. Circuit Court Split: Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. and Robinson v.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad
While the Supreme Court has decided a number of issues concerning
class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(2), 26 it has yet to rule on the
permissibility of monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule
23(b)(2). The circuit courts have regularly relied on the Advisory
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
20. See id.
21. See Changelo, supra note 4, at 143 (stating that "[m]any circuit courts have taken the
position that monetary relief may be obtained in a [Rule 23](b)(2) class action so long as the
predominant relief sought is injunctive or declaratory"); see also Robinson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2001).
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
23. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966)).
24. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interpretation
of legislative silence as ambiguity.
25. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text for an illustration of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of legislative silence as a deliberate omission by Congress.
26. See Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 1, app. U (summarizing Supreme Court
cases that have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Committee's note to Rule 23, and assume that some monetary damages are
permissible. 27 A circuit split exists, however, with regard to the standard
for determining whether the requested injunctive28 relief predominates over
any monetary relief requested by class members.
As Rule 23(b)(2) is silent regarding monetary damages, courts have
regularly relied on the Advisory Committee's note to the Rule, which
indicates only that Rule 23(b)(2) class actions "'do[] not extend to cases in
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to
money damages.' '"29 Other than seeming to provide for the existence of
some monetary damages in class actions certified under 23(b)(2), the
Advisory Committee's note fails to provide further guidance to courts to
determine whether monetary damages "predominate" in a suit.30 One of the
reasons that this issue has plagued numerous courts is that it is a
complicated task for courts to value any injunctive or declaratory relief
being requested against monetary damages in order to determine which type
of relief predominates. 3 1 Additionally, while the Supreme Court has not yet
decided on the issue of monetary damages, the Court has also not yet
decided on the proper interpretation
of the term "predominate" with regards
32
to class actions under 23(b)(2).
While not authoritative, the Court seems to be leaning towards a
narrower definition of "predominate" in 23(b)(2) class actions, a definition
where class actions seeking any monetary damages may only be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). 33 The Court, in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown,
indicated that there was a substantial possibility that classes seeking
monetary damages could only be certified under 23(b)(3). 34 At the same
time, however, the Court chose not to address this issue, as it had already
been litigated and therefore, under the principle of res judicata, the Court

27. See infra notes 43, 66 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part I.A.3.

29. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966)).
30. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 416 (5th Cir. 1998)
(stating that courts cannot always make a make precise determination as to whether
monetary or injunctive damages predominate).
32. Changelo, supra note 4, at 147-48.
33. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (per curiam). Ticor casts
"doubt on the proposition that class actions seeking money damages can be certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), noting existence of 'at least a substantial possibility' that actions seeking
money damages are certifiable only under Rule 23(b)(3)." Changelo, supra note 4, at 148
(quoting Ticor, 511 U.S. at 121); see also Jeffrey H. Dasteel & Ronda McKaig, What's
Money Got to Do with It?: How Subjective, Ad Hoc Standards for Permitting Money

Damages in Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Classes Undermine Rule 23"s Analytical
Framework, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1881, 1882 (2006). See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the narrow definition of "predominate" adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Allison.
34. Ticor, 511 U.S. at 121.
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was barred from determining the issue. 35 Additionally, the Court indicated
that "lower courts have consistently held that the presence of monetary
damages claims does not preclude class certification under... [Rule
23](b)(2)," and that, "[u]nless and until a contrary rule is adopted, courts
will continue to certify classes under ...[Rule 23](b)(2) notwithstanding
the presence of damages claims. '36 Therefore, while suggesting that
monetary damages may be inappropriate for classes certified under Rule
23(b)(2), the Court in Ticor nonetheless recognized and refrained from
altering the long-standing practice for lower courts to allow certification
37
under 23(b)(2), even when monetary damages are present.
a. Allison and the IncidentalDamages Test
In 1998, in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was the first appellate court to decide whether plaintiffs
seeking to adjudicate a Title VII class action claim under Rule 23(b)(2)
were able to seek compensatory or punitive damages in addition to
38
injunctive or declaratory relief.
The class-action lawsuit in Allison was brought by over 130 AfricanAmerican employees and job applicants of Citgo Petroleum Corporation on
behalf of over one thousand class members who had been employed by
Citgo or applied for employment with Citgo from April 1979 up until the
time of the litigation. 39 The plaintiffs alleged race-based employment
discrimination in a number of company practices, including hiring and
promotions. 40 The class-action litigants sought certification under Rule
23(b)(2), seeking both injunctive relief and the maximum amount of
41
compensatory and punitive damages permitted by law.
The Fifth Circuit applied a narrow reading of the permissibility of
monetary relief (either compensatory or punitive) for classes certified under
Rule 23(b)(2). 4 2 It held that, since injunctive or declaratory relief must be
exclusive or predominate according to the Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(2) certification was only available when the monetary

35. Id. The Court failed to decide this issue conclusively, as it declined to address this
issue on the grounds of res judicata once the lower court allowed certification under Rule
23(b)(2), even though monetary damages were also being requested. The Court also stated
that "even though [the class certification under 23(b)(2)] determination may have been
wrong, it is conclusive upon these parties," implying that certification may not have been
appropriate under those provisions in this case. Id. at 120-21. It must be noted, however,
that the primary issue in Ticor involved opt-out rights for class members under these
provisions, rather than the availability of monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2). Id.
36. Id. at 124 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the majority's opinion).
37. See id. (stating that the issue of monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2) was "an
issue [the court] need not, and indeed should not, decide [in Ticor]").
38. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
39. Id. at 407.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 407-08.
42. Id. at 425.
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relief sought was wholly incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief.43
The court held that "monetary relief predominates in [Rule 23](b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief."44
In addition to assuming the predominance of monetary damages over any
injunctive or declaratory relief requested, the court also defined "incidental"
to refer to "damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a
whole."4 5 Therefore, the court in Allison, while formally allowing for the
possibility of monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule
23(b)(2), largely limited recovery to instances in which the monetary
damages served as a group remedy and did not involve complex individual
46
determination of damages.
The standard for monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule
23(b)(2) set by the Fifth Circuit in Allison has been characterized as a
bright-line rule where "any claim for monetary relief will automatically bar
certification under Rule 23(b)(2). ''4 7 A number of other circuits, including
the Seventh Circuit in Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc.,48 the
5°
Eleventh Circuit in Murray v. Auslander4 9 and Cooper v. Southern Co.,
51
and the Sixth Circuit in Coleman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
and Reeb v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction,52 have
adopted either the "incidental test" or the narrow interpretation of
"predominance" as set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Allison,53 thereby
limiting the ability of class members seeking both injunctive and monetary
relief to certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(2).
The circuit split was created in 2001, when the Second Circuit, in
Robinson v. Metro-North Railroad, disagreed with the Allison interpretation
of monetary damages for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 54
43. Id.
44. Id. at415.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Changelo, supra note 4, at 158.
48. 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
49. 244 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2001).
50. 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Allan G. King & Kimberly R. Miers,
FindLaw, 1 th Circuit Reins in Class Action Certification Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2), http://library.findlaw.com/2005/Jan/6/133675.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2006) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit in Cooper v. Southern Co. adopted a narrow
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2), and that this was a "victory" for employers); Adele Nicholas,
Circuit Split Deepens on Discrimination Class Actions, InsideCounsel.com, Feb. 2005,
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15-159/litigation/180-1 .html
(stating
that Cooper "adopt[ed] the conservative standard set forth by the 5th Circuit in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp.").
51. 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002).
52. 435 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Circuit Review Staff, First Impressions, 2
Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 459, 481 (2006) (stating that the Sixth Circuit in Reeb v. Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation & Correction followed the Fifth Circuit in Allison, by
determining that compensatory and punitive damages were "very particularized inquiries"
and that they were not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought).
53. See Changelo, supra note 4, at 147.
54. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
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b. Robinson and the Ad Hoc BalancingApproach
The class-action lawsuit in Robinson was brought by present and former
African-American employees of Metro-North Commuter Railroad. 55 The
suit was brought on behalf of the approximately 1300 African-American
employees of Metro-North during the period from 1985 through 1996.56
Similar to Allison, the plaintiffs in this suit also alleged employment
57
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The suit alleged that the company's policy of delegating discretion to
department supervisors with regard to discipline and promotion was
exercised in a discriminatory manner towards African-American employees
based on their race. 58 The plaintiffs sought both injunctive and equitable
relief for the class as a whole, and also compensatory59 damages for class
members who alleged individual acts of discrimination.
In Robinson, the Second Circuit extensively discussed the Fifth Circuit's
holding
in Allison and declined to adopt Allison's "incidental damages"
test. 60 The court made a number of arguments against the "incidental
damages" test and in favor of a more ad hoc approach. 6 1 One reason that
the Robinson court declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach was
because it found that the Allison test eliminated judicial discretion in
deciding whether a class met the certification requirements of Rule 23.62
The court also found that an ad hoc approach, as opposed to the "incidental
damages" test, would better ensure due process for absent class members
to
and also achieve judicial efficiency by allowing district court judges
63
determine whether a claim was in the interest of judicial economy.
Instead of following the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit adopted a much
broader rule, which actually called for an ad hoc evaluation for each class

55. Id. at 155.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 164-65.
61. See id. at 163-66.
62. Id. at 164-65 (stating that, historically, district courts have had the authority to
determine whether "in their informed discretion" and "based on the particulars of the case,"
a particular class has satisfied the prerequisites of certification).
63. Id. at 165.
With respect to the [second] concern, [judicial economy,] permitting district courts
to assess issues of judicial economy and class manageability on a case-by-case
basis is superior to the one-size-fits-all approach of the incidental damages
standard. As for the [first] concern, [due process,] options other than the adoption
of the incidental damages approach exist to eradicate the due process risks posed
by (b)(2) class certification of claims for damages.
Id. The court goes on to discuss the due process issue and determines that in cases where
"non-incidental monetary relief, such as compensatory damages, is involved," due process
for absent class members would be preserved through notice and opt-out rights. Id. at 16566.
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action. 64 The Robinson approach called for the court to determine whether
"'the positive weight or value ... of the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought is predominant even though compensatory or punitive damages are
also claimed.' ' 65 The Robinson court looked to the Advisory Committee's
note for guidance in interpreting Rule 23(b)(2), thereby assuming the
relevance of the note, and concluded that the drafters' intent was to permit
class members to seek some monetary damages in addition to
"predominant" injunctive or declaratory relief. 66 The standard adopted by
the Robinson court to determine whether monetary damages are permissible
is as follows:
[W]hen presented with a motion for (b)(2) class certification of a claim
seeking both injunctive relief and non-incidental monetary damages, a
district court must "consider[] the evidence presented at a class
certification hearing and the arguments of counsel," and then assess
whether (b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of "the relative
importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and
circumstances of the case." The district court may allow (b)(2)
certification if it finds in its "informed, sound judicial discretion" that (1)
"the positive weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory or
punitive damages are also claimed," and (2) class treatment would be
efficient and manageable,
thereby achieving an appreciable measure of
67
judicial economy.
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, district courts faced with 23(b)(2) class
certification motions must examine the merits of the claim and ensure that,
(1) even without the possibility of recovering monetary damages,
reasonable plaintiffs would still bring the suit in order to obtain the
injunctive or declaratory relief being sought, and (2) the injunctive or
declaratory relief would be reasonably necessary as well as appropriate if
the plaintiffs claims were to succeed on the merits.68 Ultimately, the
64. Id. at 164.
65. Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 430 (5th Cir. 1998)
(Dennis, J., dissenting)).
66. See id. at 162.
67. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(criticizing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison, stating that "[b]y limiting (b)(2)
certification to claims involving no more than incidental damages, the standard utilized by
the district court forecloses (b)(2) class certification of all claims that include compensatory
damages (or punitive damages) even if the class-wide injunctive relief is the "form of relief
in which the plaintiffs are primarily interested") and Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting)).
68. Id. Therefore, while not all classes will be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in the
Second Circuit, the certification request cannot be denied without some investigation into the
factual circumstances of the suit, while in the Fifth Circuit virtually all "hybrid" claims will
immediately be denied certification under Rule 23(b)(2). See Changelo, supra note 4, at 14849, 158. A "hybrid" class action refers to a class action requesting both equitable and
monetary relief. See Robert M. Brava-Partain, Due Process,Rule 23, and Hybrid Classes: A
PracticalSolution, 53 Hastings L.J. 1359 (2002) (examining the class certification problems
facing courts today when confronted with hybrid class actions). A "hybrid" class action has
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Robinson test involves certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) to
address the common issues involving the injunctive relief sought, and then
treats the damages stage as if it were certified under Rule69 23(b)(3), thereby
requiring notice and opt-out rights for all class members.
Although the Fifth Circuit's incidental damages test has been followed
by a number of other circuits, the Second Circuit's approach has also been
followed. 70 In Molski v. Gleich,71 the Ninth Circuit "refuse[d] to adopt the
[incidental damages] approach set forth in Allison," 72 and held in favor of
the ad hoc balancing test that was developed in Robinson.73 The court in
Molski adopted the Robinson test over the Allison test largely because the
Robinson approach preserves judicial discretion in the district courts, and
troubling implications for the
the "bright-line rule" from Allison "holds
74
viability of future civil rights actions."
While both the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit turned to the
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 23 for guidance in determining whether
75
monetary relief was permissible for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2),
the two circuits interpreted the issue differently. The Fifth Circuit adopted
a "bright-line rule" 76 that virtually eliminates the ability for classes seeking
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) to request monetary relief in addition to
injunctive or declaratory relief.7 7 The Second Circuit, on the other hand,

adopted a more flexible "ad hoc balancing test" 78 that examines the merits
of the request for monetary damages in order to determine whether the

also been referred to as a class action where "the initial liability stage ... is certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), while the second stage of the litigation, concerning monetary relief, is
certified under Rule 23(b)(3)." Changelo, supra note 4, at 152.
69. Jon Romberg, The Hybrid Class Action as Judicial Spork: Managing Individual
Rights in a Stew of Common Wrong, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 231, 232 (2006). Therefore, in a
class action where both monetary and injunctive or declaratory relief is requested, the
Robinson approach does not require classes to specifically satisfy the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) in addition to Rule 23(b)(2). Id. However, under this approach, courts do try the
damages portion of the relief incorporating the same safeguards of notice and opt-out as
regular classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Id.
70. See Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 1, § 9.8.2.2 (5th ed. Supp. 2005) (citing
Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003)).
71. Molski, 318 F.3d 937.
72. Id. at 949.
73. Id. at 950 n.15. "Rather than adopting a particular bright-line rule, we have
examined the specific facts and circumstances of each case .... In order to determine
predominance, we have focused on the language of Rule 23(b)(2) and the intent of the
plaintiffs in bringing the suit." Id. at 950.
74. Id. at 950.
75. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-63 (2d Cir.
2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998). Both courts
specifically referred to the Advisory Committee's note in their determination that monetary
damages cannot predominate. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 162-63; Allison, 151 F.3d at 411.
76. Changelo, supra note 4, at 158. Changelo and the Second Circuit in Robinson both
label the Allison test as a "bright-line" rule. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 163-64; Changelo, supra
note 4, at 158.
77. See Changelo, supra note 4, at 158.
78. Id. at 161.
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monetary relief or the injunctive relief predominates. While the approach
of the Second Circuit does not allow for classes certified under Rule
23(b)(2) to seek unlimited monetary damages, it more readily enables
classes seeking both monetary and injunctive relief to litigate their claims
through class-action lawsuits, by preserving judicial discretion in
determining whether the combined relief requested by a class of litigants
79
satisfies the certification requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).
B. Interpretationof Statutes
There is a long-standing debate in the Supreme Court concerning
statutory interpretation. On one side of this debate are those justices,
including Justice Antonin Scalia, who endorse a textualist or plain-meaning
approach to interpretation. 80 On the other side are justices, including
Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer, who support a more
flexible approach that utilizes extrinsic sources to determine the purpose of
a statute. 8 1 The traditional approach to statutory construction is for the
Court to interpret a statute in accordance with "the original intent and
purpose of the enacting Congress. ' '82 In recent decades, however, the
Supreme Court has been moving towards a stronger plain-meaning
approach, which Professor William Eskridge has termed "the new
83
textualism."
79. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164-65 (stating that Rule 23 has historically been interpreted
to provide district courts with the discretion to determine whether the certification
requirements were met by a specific class, and that the Allison rule served to "nullify the
district court's ... discretion") (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting));
see also Stamps, supra note 4, at 411 (arguing that "the Robinson test preserves judicial
discretion to certify Rule 23(b)(2) classes" by "[e]nabl[ing] [courts] to objectively valuate
the requested relief").
80. Christian E. Mammen, Using Legislative History in American Statutory
Interpretation 153 (2002) (describing Justice Scalia as "the Court's leading opponent of
legislative history" and who "has argued at length" that "legislative history should be
banished from statutory interpretation"); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1074 (1993)
(explaining that the current focus on the plain-meaning approach is "most commonly
attributed to Justice Scalia").
81. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2628-31 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (supporting a broad interpretation of ambiguity, which then allows
courts to consult legislative history); Mammen, supra note 80, at 153 (stating that Justice
Breyer, of all the current Justices, has been the most articulate in favoring the use of
legislative history).
82. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 626 (1990).
Under this traditional approach, what Eskridge calls the "soft plain meaning rule,"
"legislative history is usually relevant, either to supply meaning for an ambiguous statute or
to confirm or rebut the plain meaning of a clear statute." Id. For an illustration of this
traditional approach, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-33, 433 n.12 (1987),
where the Court examined the legislative history of the statute at issue to determine whether
there was a "clearly expressed legislative intention" that contradicted the statutory language.
83. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 623-24. Eskridge attributes the new textualism, in large
part, to Justice Scalia, and describes this approach as "posit[ing] that once the Court has
ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes
irrelevant." Id. at 623; see also Moore, supra note 80, at 1073 (stating that recently the
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1. Background on Statutory Interpretation
a. The Plain-MeaningApproach
The modern plain-meaning or textualist approach views the goal of
statutory interpretation as discerning the text's "plain" meaning. 84 As 85a
result, this view focuses primarily on the text of the statute in question.
Under the plain-meaning approach, absent ambiguity, a court will interpret
a statute based on the text of the statute alone. 86 Courts applying a plainmeaning approach will also look to the statute as a whole to determine the
context of the phrase or subject in question to provide guidance for
interpretation. 87 Therefore, if a statute is unambiguous, the modern plainmeaning approach would allow courts to "consider[] ...dictionaries 88 and

Supreme Court has "increasingly relied on a 'plain meaning' analysis to dispose of difficult
questions involving the interpretation and application of various Federal Rules").
84. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and
Statutory Interpretation 231 (2d ed. 2006). "For a meaning to be 'plain,' ... it must be only
the most plausible meaning and need not be free from any semblance of doubt." Office of
Legal Policy, Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of the Status of
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation 71 (1989).
85. Michael Sinclair, Guide to Statutory Interpretation 107 (2000) ("'It is elementary
that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which
the act is framed ... ' (quoting Justice William Day in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485-86 (1917))).
86. See id. (discussing Chief Justice John Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819), and Justice Henry Brown in Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S.
414, 421 (1899)). According to Sinclair, the plain-meaning rule advanced by Justice
Marshall would permit "access to legislative history if the statute is ambiguous" or if "the
statute applie[d] to the facts generates 'absurdity or injustice,"' while Justice Brown would
only allow access to the legislative history in instances where the language of the statute is
ambiguous. Id. For purposes of this Note, Justice Marshall's interpretation will generally be
considered the plain-meaning rule.
87. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 669 (stating that Justice Scalia, a "new textualist," will
consider the language of the entire statute to provide context and give meaning to the "bare
language of statutes").
88. The dictionary would indicate the common meaning of a term at the time the statute
was enacted, which may shed light on Congress' intended meaning of a term. See Mammen,
supra note 80, at 15-16. "Generally, the Supreme Court uses dictionaries to provide 'plain
meaning' translations for key terms in a statutory provision." Id. at 15; see, e.g., Mississippi
v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1992) (consulting Webster's New InternationalDictionary
to determine the plain meaning of the term "exclusive" in a statute). Additionally, to deal
with the fact that the meaning of words often changes over time, the Supreme Court has
"expressed a preference for the definition in operation at the time the statute was enacted."
Mammen, supra note 80, at 16 (citing Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of
Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)). For a recent example of a case in
which the Supreme Court looks to the dictionary to aid in statutory interpretation, see
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2801 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (looking to the
1961 edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary for guidance as to the
meaning of the term "practicable" at the time a statute was enacted, in order to best
determine Congress's intent), and id. at 2852 (Alito, J., dissenting) (defining the terms
"regular" and "special" by examining the definitions in the 1913 edition of Webster's Third
New InternationalDictionary).
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grammar books, the whole statute, analogous provisions in other statutes,8 9
canons of construction, 90 and the common sense God gave us." 9 1 In the
context of Supreme Court statutory interpretation, ambiguity arises when
92
the text of a statute is open to at least two or more ways of interpretation.
If there is ambiguity in a statute, then this approach would suggest looking
to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history, to effectuate the
drafters' intent behind the statute. 9 3 Absent ambiguity, this approach
deliberately avoids extrinsic sources, in part because extrinsic sources,
especially legislative history, tend to be murky and complicated, and they
94
often provide little insight into the purpose of the statute.
The current Supreme Court usually interprets statutes using a plainmeaning or textualist approach. 9 5 According to one scholar, those who
follow the plain-meaning approach rarely find a statute to be ambiguous,
and therefore rarely find the need to investigate the legislative intent. 96 Due
in part to Justice Scalia's criticism of the liberal use of extrinsic sources, in
recent years "the Court has been much more willing to ignore legislative
history, has been slightly more reluctant to deviate from the apparent
meaning of the statutory text, and has relied more heavily than before on
'97
structural arguments and canons of statutory interpretation.

89. Analogous provisions in other statutes may provide a contrast with regards to the
word choice, and therefore the intent, of a particular statute. See Mammen, supra note 80, at
15-16.
90. The canons of construction are rules that courts may invoke to help interpret statutes
and have been used to determine whether a statute is ambiguous. See id. at 25-26 for a
discussion of the use of canons of construction in statutory interpretation.
91. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 669. "The only context not normally considered is
legislative history, and most of the new textualists will consider legislative history if the
other aids still leave the statutory meaning truly unclear." Id. While it may seem that some
of these sources, including dictionaries, analogous provisions in other statutes, and the
canons of construction are extrinsic to the text, they are consulted to supplement the text and
are considered to be part of the context of the statute rather than as extrinsic sources. Id.
(stating that "[t]he new textualism considers [these sources] as context").
92. Mamnen, supra note 80, at 33 (stating that "[i]n essence, in Supreme Court practice,
a statute is ambiguous whenever a majority of Justices determines that, as applied to the facts
of the case, the statutory text may reasonablybe given two or more interpretations").
93. Sinclair, supra note 85, at 107 (stating that, when the meaning is susceptible to
multiple constructions, "the court may look into [among other factors,] prior and
contemporaneous acts [and] "the reasons which induced the act" (quoting Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899))).
94. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005); see
also infra Part II.A.
95. See Sinclair, supra note 85, at 109. While the plain-meaning approach was prevalent
in the Supreme Court at the time of Caminetti in 1917, from that time until the 1980s, when
Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Supreme Court "seemed to have completely abandoned
the [plain-meaning rule]." Id. Since Justice Scalia's appointment to the Court, however, the
Court has once again largely adopted a plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation.
Id.
96. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1074-75.
97. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 625 (describing the shift in the approach to statutory
interpretation that occurred during Justice Scalia's first two years on the Supreme Court).
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1. The Current Situation: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah
Allapattah,98 decided in June 2005, is a case interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
1367, the statute authorizing supplemental jurisdiction for the federal
courts. Allapattah represents the most recent decision by the Supreme
Court that sets out the Court's standards for statutory interpretation and the
use of extrinsic sources in interpretation. 99 Justice Anthony Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, which was a five-to-four decision. 10 0
Allapattah was a class-action lawsuit filed in 1991 on behalf of
approximately ten thousand Exxon Mobile dealers against the Exxon
Corporation. 1 1 The suit was filed in federal court, invoking diversity
jurisdiction, and alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by Exxon to
overcharge the plaintiffs for fuel. 10 2 As not all of the named plaintiffs met
the minimum amount in controversy required for federal diversity
jurisdiction, the issue was whether the district court had "properly exercised
§ 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members who did
not meet the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy." 10 3 The
Eleventh Circuit had affirmed the district court's holding and permitted
supplementary jurisdiction over the plaintiff class members who did not
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. 104 The Supreme Court held
that where are least one plaintiff satisfied the amount-in-controversy
requirement, and the other elements of jurisdiction were satisfied, § 1367
allowed federal jurisdiction for the claims of class members who did not
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.10 5
98. 125 S. Ct. at2611.
99. See generally id. at 2626-28. In the months since Allapattah, the Supreme Court has
also decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), which also involved the
application of a primarily plain-meaning approach. In the opinion, written by Justice
Stevens, the Court interpreted § 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L.
No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
The statute governs the treatment of detainees and applies to pending cases; however, the
statute is silent as to whether it applies to pending applications for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was at issue in that case. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-65.
100. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2614.
101. Id. at 2615.
102. Id. The Exxon dealers alleged that Exxon breached an agreement to provide
discounts to dealers for customers using credit cards to purchase gasoline by failing to
provide the discount for the dealers between March 1983 and August 1994, thereby
overcharging the dealers for the fuel. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d
1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003).
103. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000), the
minimum amount in controversy required is currently $75,000 for federal diversity
jurisdiction cases. Id. at 2617.
104. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253-54. The Court interpreted the language of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 to "allow[] a district court entertaining a diversity class action to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over class members whose claims do not meet the jurisdictional minimum
amount in controversy requirement." Id. at 1254.
105. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625. The Court specifically held that, in a case of
diversity jurisdiction, "where... at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over
the claims of other plaintiffs ... even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional
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While Allapattah's specific holding pertains to supplemental jurisdiction
under § 1367, the Court extensively discussed the issue of statutory
interpretation. 10 6 The Court based its holding on a textualist or plainmeaning approach to statutory interpretation.
As [the Supreme Court] ha[s] repeatedly held, the authoritative statement
is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic
material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to
the extent they shed a reliable light on 107
the enacting Legislature's
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.
The majority of the Court in Allapattah found the text of the statute to be
unambiguous and thus limited its inquiry to the text. 10 8 In short, the
Supreme Court's holding in Allapattah represents the "textualist" or "plainmeaning" view of statutory interpretation, where extrinsic sources of the
drafters' intent are only relevant when there is ambiguity in the text of the
statute. 109
b. The Purposive or IntentionalApproach
Another view of statutory interpretation, which has been termed
,,purposivism 110 or "intentionalism,"' 111 views the goal or objective of
statutory interpretation as enforcing legislative intent. 112 As a result, this
view allows courts to look to extrinsic sources for the drafters' intent in

amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction." Id. at
2615.
106. Id. at 2625-27 (discussing statutory interpretation in general, and the interpretation
of § 1367 in particular).
107. Id. at 2626 (supporting a plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation where
extrinsic sources are only appropriate when the terms of the statute are ambiguous).
108. Id. at 2625. The Court indicated that the majority's interpretation of the statute was
in accordance with the text, other statutory provisions, and the "established jurisprudence" of
the Court. Id. While limiting the inquiry to these sources, Justice Kennedy also stated
that,"[e]ven if we were to stipulate, however, that the reading these proponents urge upon us
is textually plausible, the legislative history cited to support it would not alter our view as to
the best interpretation of § 1367." Id.
109. See Jacobs v. Brenmer, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (interpreting
Allapattah to signify that "it is impermissible to consult legislative history when the statutory
language is unambiguous").
110. Michael Livingston, PracticalReason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretationof Tax
Statutes, 51 Tax L. Rev. 677, 680-81 (1996) (referring to the theory developed by Professors
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, where "a court interpreting a statute first should attribute a
purpose to the statute (or its subordinate provision), and then '[i]nterpret the words of the
statute... so as to carry out the purpose as best it can"' (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. &
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law
1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958))).
111. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradoxof Delegation: Interpretingthe FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1152 (2002); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Justice Breyer: Intentionalist,Pragmatist,and Empiricist, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 747, 747
(1995) (defining "intentionalism" as "interpreting a statute based on a judicial determination
of the intent of the legislature").
112. See Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 84, at 219.
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adopting a statute, even when the text is not obviously ambiguous. 113 The
core of this approach is that, when construing a statute, judges should
consider a number of factors, including the legislative history and the
purpose of the statute, in addition to the text. 114 This view, which Professor
Daniel Farber has called "practical reason," does not presume that relying
solely on the text of a statute is necessarily the appropriate way of
interpreting the statute. 115 This approach seeks to remain faithful to the
specific language that the
purpose and intent of the statute, as opposed to
116
statute.
the
into
put
to
chose
ultimately
drafters
While the Supreme Court has been moving towards a plain-meaning
approach to statutory interpretation in recent decades, courts have
traditionally applied the purposive approach to statutory interpretation,
where the purpose of the statute or the intent of the drafters guided the
interpretation of the statute. 117 In interpreting a statute, courts would
initially examine the text of the statute to determine if there was a plain
meaning to the text. 118 Generally, however, "[u]nder this approach, if a

113. According to Professor Eskridge, one type of plain-meaning rule, which he refers to
as the "soft plain meaning rule," is closely related to a purposive interpretation. See
Eskridge, supra note 82, at 626-27. Under the "soft" approach, a plain meaning can be
overcome by compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent, and thus the interpreter
must always check plain meaning against legislative background. See Eskridge, Frickey &
Garrett, supra note 84, at 231-33. This approach, much like a purposive approach, would
require courts always to consult the legislative history, not solely to determine legislative
intent, but rather to determine whether there is compelling evidence of legislative intent that
contradicts the plain language of the statute. See id.; Sinclair, supra note 85, at 109. Using
the "soft" plain-meaning approach in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,Inc., the Court carved
out an exception to the plain-meaning rule "in rare cases [where] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters"-in such
cases, "those intentions must be controlling." 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). Additionally,
according to Eskridge, "[iun almost all of the leading plain-meaning cases of the Warren and
Burger Courts, the Court checked the legislative history to be certain that its confidence in
the clear text did not misread the legislature's intent." Eskridge, supra note 82, at 627.
114. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 537 (1992).
115. Id. at 535-37.
116. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2629 (2005)
(Stevens, J.,dissenting) (criticizing the majority for treating statutory interpretation as a
"pedantic exercise," rather than a "serious attempt at ascertaining congressional intent").
117. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 626 (discussing the "soft" plain-meaning rule in which
courts usually consult legislative history to ensure that their "plain meaning" interpretation is
supported by the legislative intent). According to Professor Eskridge, there exists a "long
line of Supreme Court decisions stating or suggesting that the only task of the Court in
statutory interpretation is to determine congressional intent or purpose." Id. One example of
such a case is Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984), which described the
Court's sole task as determining whether Congress intended a specific tax allowance in the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
118. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 624. Generally, "plain meaning" essentially refers to
interpretation in light of the "ordinary and obvious meaning" of the words in the statute. See
id. at 626-27. The Supreme Court specifically uses the term "plain meaning" (as well as
"ordinary meaning") "to refer to meanings of a statutory text that are apparent from the text
alone (at least to members of the Court), without references to external sources or
interpretive aids." Mammen, supra note 80, at 12.
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statute is ambiguous, legislative history often will be decisive, and even an
apparently plain meaning can be rebutted by legislative history." 11 9 As a
result of this relatively liberal approach to legislative history, courts
regularly consulted extrinsic sources "including committee reports, floor
debates, 120 hearings, rejected proposals, and even legislative silence" to
determine the purpose or intent of a statute. 12 1 Other examples of extrinsic
sources that courts may consult include other statutes, judicial opinions,
administrative materials, secondary sources, dictionaries, and canons of
1 22
construction.
A recent example of this approach to statutory interpretation is the
dissent in Allapattah, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
Breyer. 123 While the purposive approach does not require looking to
extrinsic sources for guidance, especially when there seems to be a "plain
meaning" to the statute, 124 courts would generally consult extrinsic sources
when there is ambiguity in the statute. In his dissent, Justice Stevens,
unlike Justice Kennedy and the majority, found the text of the statute to be
ambiguous, and therefore turned to the legislative history for guidance. 12 5
Justice Stevens, agreeing with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent, found
the legislative history to provide support for an alternate interpretation of
§ 1367, in which § 1367 requires each litigant to satisfy the amount in
26
controversy requirement. 1
According to Justice Stevens, "'ambiguity' is a term that may have
different meanings for different judges"' 127 and is "apparently in the eye of
the beholder."' 128 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's opinion because
it decided that the statute at issue was unambiguous and that its reading of
the statute was the only possible correct interpretation. 129 Because some
119. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 624.
120. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2767 n.10 (2006). In Hamdan,
Justice Stevens consulted floor statements by a number of senators for guidance in
determining Congress's intent with respect to the DTA. Id.
121. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 624. Compare this list with the sources listed in supra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text. The scope of the materials consulted under the
purposive approach is broader than those consulted under the plain-meaning or new
textualist approach.
122. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implicationsfor the Legislative History Debate and Beyond,

51 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1998) (discussing some of the "extrinsic" sources used by the
Supreme Court in statutory interpretation during the 1996 Term).
123. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2628-31 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 624.
125. See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2628-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that the
statutory text may have been ambiguous and suggesting that legislative history should still
be consulted when a statute is deemed unambiguous).
126. See id. at 2629-31; see also id. at 2631-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there is a more plausible reading of the statute than that of the majority's opinion, thereby
implying that the language of the statute is ambiguous).
127. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. See id.
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courts may find a statute ambiguous, while others may find that same
provision to be unambiguous, Justice Stevens encouraged a broader
130
approach to the use of legislative history and the definition of ambiguity.
Instead of the majority's approach, he suggested that "it is unwise to treat
the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative
history is consulted."' 13 1 Therefore, Justice Stevens advocated a broad
approach to ambiguity, which would then allow courts to interpret a statute
in accordance with "all reliable evidence of legislative intent" 132 and more
accurately interpret statutes in accordance with their purpose.
c. Legislative Silence: Ambiguity or a DeliberateOmission?
While courts can interpret the text of a statute using a plain-meaning or a
purposive approach, the text may be silent as to whether particular conduct
is within the scope of a statute. This creates a new problem for courtshow to interpret statutory silence. If a statute is silent as to a certain
subject, this silence can be interpreted in one of two ways: It can be seen to
represent ambiguity in the statute, or it can be viewed as a deliberate
omission by Congress of the subject in question from the statute. 133 The
Supreme Court has interpreted silence in both of these ways, which has led
34
to confusion as to the appropriate way to interpret silence. 1
One interpretation is that silence, in a text, represents ambiguity.' 35 With
respect to federal statutes, the Supreme Court has indicated that "the silence
of Congress is ambiguous."' 136 Additionally, the Court has indicated that
7
statutory silence generally creates ambiguity, instead of resolving it. 13 If
silence is construed as ambiguity, courts would be required to look to
extrinsic sources for guidance in interpreting a text when the statute is silent

130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004)

(Stevens, J., concurring) ("In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look
at legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities.
It would be wiser to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available
evidence of Congress' true intent when interpreting its work product.").
133. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, CongressionalSilence in the Supreme Court,47 U. Miami
L. Rev. 375, 375-76 (1992); see also Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to

Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative Process 37-39 (1997) (discussing how legislative
silence can also be used by courts to confirm prior statutory interpretations if the legislature
fails to address the issue).
134. See generally Rotenberg, supra note 133 (discussing a number of different ways that

congressional silence has been interpreted by the Supreme Court).
135. See id. at 375 (stating that ambiguity is a result of silence because "silence does not
define itself').
136. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); see also Carlisle
v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 449 (1996) (referring to "ambiguous silence").
137. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002).
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on a particular issue, 138 regardless of whether a court is a proponent of the
plain-meaning or purposive approach to interpretation.
The other approach taken by the Supreme Court is to interpret statutory
silence as a deliberate omission by Congress. 139 Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer illustrates this approach. 140 In Youngstown, President Harry
Truman seized the country's steel mills, whose workers were on strike, in
order to provide materials needed to support the Korean War. 14 1 While
President Truman claimed he had authority to seize the steel mills, the
Supreme Court disagreed. 142 The Court was unable to find any specific
provision either in any statute or in the Constitution which authorized
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills. 143 The Court held that while
the Constitution gives the President the power to execute the laws,
Congress was the only branch of the federal government with the
constitutional authority to make laws. 144 Here, Congress failed to provide
the President with the explicit authority to engage in the act of seizing the
steel mills. 145 Therefore, the Court found Congress's silence about the
presidential authority to seize the steel mills to be a lack of approval, an
146
indication that the President lacked the power to take this action.
Youngstown is one of the most prominent decisions where legislative
silence was interpreted as a deliberate omission in a statute, and the
Supreme Court continues to apply this interpretation to statutory silence.
More recently, the Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 147 treated legislative

138. See Sinclair, supra note 85, at 107 (indicating that courts will look to extrinsic
sources, including legislative history, for guidance if a statute is found to be ambiguous); see
also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
139. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (stating that, with regards to
different provisions of a single statute, "where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion"); see
also Eskridge, supra note 82, at 640 (indicating that legislative silence often represents
ambiguity, but it can also "be supporting evidence of legislative intent," implying that
silence may be interpreted as a deliberate omission by Congress).
140. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that Congress's failure to expressly grant authority to
the President indicated that the President lacked such authority).
141. See id. at 582-83.
142. See id. at 589; see also Rotenberg, supra note 133, at 376-77 (discussing the
Youngstown case and arguing that this interpretation of silence is "unwise").
143. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585, 587-88. "There is no statute that expressly authorizes
the President to take possession of property ... [njor is there any act of Congress... from
which such a power can fairly be implied." Id. at 585.
144. Id. at 588.
145. Id. at 586 ("[T]he plan Congress adopted in [the Taft-Hartley Act] did not provide
for seizure under any circumstances.").
146. Id. at 585 (holding that "[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself'). The Court stated, "There is
no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did
here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which
such a power can fairly be implied." Id.
147. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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silence in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) as a deliberate
48
omission by Congress. 1
C. How the Supreme Court Has InterpretedFederalRules of Civil
Procedure
1. Interpretation of Rule 11 by the Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has not promulgated a standard by which to
interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "the Court routinely uses
principles of statutory interpretation in construing the rules."' 149 As a result,
the Court has been leaning towards a plain-meaning view of interpreting the
Federal Rules, especially Rule 11, throughout the past few decades. 150 The
Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 11 can serve to illustrate the
approach that the Court has taken towards interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, even though the Court has yet to address directly how they
should be interpreted. Generally, the plain-meaning interpretation looks to
the text of a rule as a whole, in addition to the language at issue, to
determine the interpretation of the rule, much in the same way that the
plain-meaning approach is used to interpret statutes.151
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides for sanctions to be placed
upon attorneys in federal courts. 152 In one important case, Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,153 the Court examined the phrase
"person who signed" in Rule 11.154 At the time, Rule 11 called for
sanctioning the "person who signed" any offending document. 155 The issue
facing the Court was whether sanctions could be imposed on an attorney's
law firm in addition to the attorney who signed the document. 156 Following
a plain-meaning approach and examining the phrase in the context of the
rest of the Rule, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the
sanctions extended only to the attorney who signed the document and not to

148. Id. at2766.
149. Schacter, supra note 122, at 11 (citing Moore, supra note 80).
150. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1076 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court with regards to Rule 11 between 1989 and 1991).
151. Id. at 1076-78.
152. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. For a thorough discussion of Rule 11 and its interpretation
by courts, see Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law, Perspectives and
Preventive Measures (3d ed. 2004).
153. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
154. The Court in Pavelic relied on the text of Rule 11 prior to 1993, which stated that
"[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court ...shall
impose upon the person who signed it... an appropriate sanction .. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
(1983) (amended 1993).

155. The phrase "person who signed" was present in the text of Rule 11 until the Rule
was amended in 1993, when the text was altered such that sanctions could be imposed upon
"the attorneys, law firms, or parties" that violate the Rule's provisions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c).
156. Pavelic, 493 US. at 121.
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the attorney's law firm. 15 7 Applying the plain-meaning standard, the
majority found the phrase to be unambiguous when examined in the context
of the rest of the provisions of Rule 11.158 The Court stated that sanctions
were to be limited to the individual signer of the offending document
because the paragraph referenced only the individual signer and found it
"strange to think that the phrase 'person who signed' in the last sentence [of
the paragraph] refers to the partnership represented by the signing
attorney .. ." 159 Therefore, in applying the plain-meaning approach, the
Court examined the context of the Rule as a whole and determined that
sanctions could only be imposed upon the individual attorney who signed a
document in violation of Rule 11, and not the law firm with which the
60
attorney was associated. 1
Justice Thurgood Marshall was the sole dissenter in Pavelic.161 Relying
on the Advisory Committee's note for guidance, he called for giving trial
judges greater flexibility than the majority's view and allowing judges to
impose sanctions on the individual attorney, the attorney's law firm, or
both, at the judge's discretion. 162 According to Justice Marshall, his
interpretation of Rule 11 was in line with Rule I's broad purpose, which
"is to strengthen the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police abusive
litigation practices and to provide him sufficient flexibility to craft penalties
appropriate to each case." 163 As a result, Justice Marshall found the
majority's opinion to be overly restrictive by providing immunity for law
firms from any sanctions placed on their attorneys' misconduct. 164 By
interpreting Rule 11 to fit with the purpose of the Rule, as evidenced by the
Advisory Committee's note, Justice Marshall applied the purposive
approach. In contrast, the majority's opinion, which limits sanctions to the
actual person who signed an offending document, is an example of the
plain-meaning approach being applied to Rule 11.
Two other cases where the Supreme Court interpreted other aspects of
Rule 11 are Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.16 5 and Business Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,Inc.166 In Cooter & Gell, a law
firm was sanctioned under Rule 11 by a district court, even after the firm
filed for a voluntary dismissal of a suit for unfair competition. 16 7 The Court
considered whether Rule 11 allows sanctioning a plaintiff who has
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
See id. at 126-27.
Id. at 127-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

162. Moore, supra note 80, at 1078-79. According to Professor Moore, Justice
Marshall's approach demonstrated that the Court's plain-meaning approach was "not the
only reasonable interpretation consistent with the text of the Rule," thereby implying that the
text was ambiguous and extrinsic sources should have been consulted. Id.
163. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 127.
164. Id.
165. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
166. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
167. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 389.
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voluntarily dismissed his or her suit and whether courts can award
attorneys' fees on appeal as part of a sanction. 168 The majority, represented
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, indicated that it was interpreting Rule 11
in light of its plain meaning.' 69 The Court based its analysis on the text of
Rule 11 as of the 1983 Amendments to the Rule. 170 At the time, the Rule
indicated that "[a]n attorney who signs the paper without such a
' 17 1
substantiated belief 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.'
As a result, and in accordance with the text of the Rule, the Court upheld
the sanctions the lower court had imposed upon the petitioners despite the
fact that the petitioners had voluntarily dismissed the suit shortly after the
request for sanctions. 172 In this case, however, the Court also found its
interpretation of Rule 11 to satisfy the intent of the Rule, which is to "deter
baseless filings" and to streamline federal procedure. 173 Therefore, in
Cooter & Gell, "the Court appeared to be much more sensitive to allowing
policy and other considerations to inform its analysis" than in its previous
74
interpretations of the Rule.1
Like Cooter & Gell, Business Guides 175 also involved a plain-meaning
interpretation of Rule 11. The Court in Business Guides chose to interpret
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like statutes, by their plain meaning
and to limit its inquiry to the text of the Rules if the text is "clear and
unambiguous."' 176 In Business Guides, the Court was faced with
interpretation of the same version of Rule 11 as the Court in Cooter & Gell,
where the text of the Rule indicated that "[i]f a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court shall impose upon the
person who signed it an appropriate sanction." 177 The Court held that the
plain meaning of the Rule was that any party who signed a pleading or
other court document would be sanctioned if the signing was done before a
reasonable inquiry was conducted.178 Based on the text, Rule 11 sanctions
were found to apply to represented parties, in addition to counsel and
unrepresented parties, even when the signature of a represented party is

168. Id. at 388.
169. Id. at 391.
170. Id. at 393.
171. Id. The rule in Cooter & Gell has since been partially superseded by the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, which provide for a "safe harbor" in which a party has 21 days to
voluntarily dismiss a suit after a request for sanctions has been made before being
sanctioned. See De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomms., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(l)(A). Under the current text of Rule 11, the
petitioners in Cooter & Gell would not have been sanctioned. See De La Fuente, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 257 n.4.
172. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 394-95.
173. Id. at 393.
174. Moore, supra note 80, at 1079. For further discussion of Cooter & Gell, see id. at
1079-80.

175.
176.
177.
178.

498 U.S. 533 (1991).
Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 541.
See id.
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present, but not required for the document. 17 9 As a result, the Court
interpreted Rule 11 to allow for "[p]arties, as well as counsel, [to] be
sanctioned if they sign papers without first undertaking a reasonable inquiry
into their factual and legal basis." 180 As in Cooter & Gell, the majority
indicated that it was interpreting the Rule in light of its purpose, which was
"to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable
responsibility."' 8'1 While in these decisions the Court seemed to apply a
more flexible interpretation of Rule 11, the Court still chose to apply the
plain-meaning standard to the interpretation of the Rule and found support
182
for the plain-meaning interpretation in the general purpose of the Rule.
D. The Creation of the FederalRules: What Sets Them Apartfrom the
Statutory Process?
1. The Process Behind the Creation of Federal Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure undergo a multi-step process prior
to their enactment. 183 The Rules were first promulgated under the Rules
Enabling Act, which was originally passed in 1934.184 The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934 gave the Supreme Court the "authority to make and publish
rules in actions at law." 185 The Act gave the Supreme Court the power to
make general rules governing motions, pleadings, writs, and other
proceedings and procedure in civil actions, provided that "[s]aid rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant."' 186 As a result of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Congress thus
delegated the authority to create the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the
Supreme Court. 187 Since the Supreme Court oversees the creation of the
Federal Rules, unlike the passage of statutes, it would be logical to assume
that the Court, and the judicial branch in general, would not be overstepping
its authority when taking an active role in interpreting Federal Rules.
179. Id. at 542-43.
180. Moore, supra note 80, at 1081. Compare Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 543-48, with
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1989) (demonstrating the
increasingly flexible plain-meaning approach used by the Supreme Court with regards to the
interpretation and application of Rule 11).
181. Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 547 (quoting Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 126).
182. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1079-85 for a discussion of the three Rule 11 cases.
183. For a complete discussion of the rulemaking process, see Moore, supra note 80, at
1041-73 and Struve, supra note 111, at 1103-19.
184. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
185. Id.
186. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1941) (citing the Rules Enabling Act).
187. Moore, supra note 80, at 1041-42 (describing the modem formulation of the Rules
Enabling Act as indicating that "Congress delegated to the court the power to promulgate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); see also Struve, supra note 111, at 1105 (explaining that
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 involved the delegation of the majority of the rulemaking
power to the Supreme Court, while preserving the power to prevent the proposed Rules from
going into effect for Congress).
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While the Court itself has the power to draft the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it has relied on the Advisory Committee to draft proposed
rules. 188 Currently, proposed rules go through a series of seven formal
stages prior to approval and are reviewed by at least five institutions: the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Supreme Court, and Congress. 18 9 After a proposed rule is drafted by the
Advisory Committee, the next step involves proposed changes, where
anyone (including judges, practitioners and even members of the public)
can recommend changes to the proposed rule, which are considered by the
Advisory Committee. 190 If the Committee accepts any of the suggestions,
the text of the proposed rule and an accompanying explanatory note are
redrafted. 19 1 Next, the Advisory Committee seeks approval from the
Standing Committee to publish the proposal, and, if approved by the
Standing Committee, the proposal is circulated for public comment. 192 The
proposal is then reconsidered by the Advisory Committee in light of the
public comments, and the final draft of the rule, along with the note, are
submitted to the Standing Committee for approval. 193 Upon approval by
the Standing Committee, the rule and note are sent to the Judicial
Conference and then to the Supreme Court for approval. 194 Generally, if
the Standing Committee makes substantial revisions to the proposal, the
Standing Committee sends the proposal back to the Advisory Committee
for further revision and approval; however, the Standing Committee has
been known to make substantial revisions to proposals and then forward
them onto the Judicial Conference directly. 195 Finally, if the rule and note
are approved by the Supreme Court, they are forwarded to Congress by
May 1st. 196 If Congress fails to take action contrary to the proposed rule, it
188. Moore, supra note 80, at 1061 (explaining that the Court has "always relied upon a
series of Advisory Committees to draft proposed Rules" rather than attempt to independently
draft Federal Rules).
189. Struve, supra note 111, at 1103-04 (providing an overview of the current rulemaking
process).
190. See id. at 1103-04. The proposed changes to a rule or amendment to an existing rule
are first collected and analyzed by the Advisory Committee Reporter. See id. at 1103. These
suggestions are then submitted to the Advisory Committee along with a recommendation for
disposition from the Reporter. Id.
191. Id. at 1104. The suggestions are considered at a biannual meeting of the Committee,
and suggestions that have been accepted by the Committee are given to the Reporter, who
prepares a proposed draft amendment and an explanatory note. Id. at 1103-04.
192. Id. at 1104. Upon approval by the Standing Committee, both the proposed draft of
the rule and the explanatory note are "circulated for public comment." Id.
193. Id. If the Advisory Committee makes extensive changes to the draft as a result of
the public comments, the rule and note may again be submitted for public comment, prior to
being submitted to the Standing Committee for approval. See id. at 1104 n.7.
194. Id. at 1104. "Proposals forwarded by the Standing Committee are considered by the
Judicial Conference once a year .... If the Conference approves the proposed rule and
note, then the Conference forwards it to the Supreme Court. Id.
195. See id. at 1104 n.7.
196. Id. at 1115. Upon approval by the Supreme Court, the proposed rule and note are
forwarded to Congress by the Chief Justice prior to May 1st of "the year in which the
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becomes effective as of December 1st. 19 7 As evidenced by this multi-step
process involving five different committees and the public, the Federal
Rules are promulgated in a manner that is significantly different from
statutes.1 98 While the Supreme Court does not take an active role in the
proposed drafting of each rule, the Court is involved in the ultimate
approval of the text and accompanying Advisory Committee's note. 199 As
a result, it may be appropriate for the judicial branch to take an active role
and defer
in the interpretation of Federal Rules and also to consult regularly
20 0
often to the Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules.
2. The Advisory Committee's Notes
While the nature of the Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure has changed a great deal since the inception of the
Federal Rules, today the notes are integral to the rulemaking process, as
they accompany a rule through every stage of approval. 20 ' Since 1988, the
Advisory Committee has been using the notes to "indicate an amendment's
purpose, guide future interpretations, discuss the amendment's relation to
surrounding law, and provide practice tips for lawyers and judges," 20 2 and
thus "inform the rulemaking process itself."20 3 This shift in the nature of
the notes is, in part, a result of the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling
Act, which now requires an "explanatory note" from the Advisory
to accompany any proposed amendments to the Federal
Committee
2 04
Rules.
The Advisory Committee's notes are distinct from other extrinsic
sources, including legislative history. While legislative history has been
criticized for being "murky, ambiguous, and contradictory," 20 5 this
criticism does not apply to the Advisory Committee's notes. 20 6 Not only
are the Advisory Committee's notes a single source as opposed to various
committee reports, debates, hearings, and other materials that comprise
legislative history, but they are also intended to serve as a guide for
amendment is to take effect," giving Congress more than seven months to review the
proposal. Id at 1104. Professor Struve refers to this step as the "Report-and-Wait
Requirement." See id. at 1115-19 (describing the "Report-and-Wait Requirement" in detail).
197. Id. at 1104.
198. Comparesupra note 196 and accompanying text, with U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
199. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
200. See, Struve, supra note 111, at 1169. The author compares the interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the interpretation of the commentary to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as well as agency interpretations and concludes that the Advisory
Committee's notes should always be consulted and given binding effect unless directly at
odds with the text of the rule. Id. at 1167-69.
201. Id. at 1112-14.
202. Id. at 1112-13.
203. Id. at 1113.
204. Id. at 1113-14.
205. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005).
206. See Struve, supra note 111, at 1158-61 (analyzing the Advisory Committee's notes
in light of the problems associated with legislative history).
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interpreting the Federal Rules. 207 Additionally, the Advisory Committee's
notes can be considered a great deal more official than legislative history
documents. 20 8 The Advisory Committee's notes accompany a proposed
rule through every stage of the approval process, beginning with the first
draft of the rule and continuing through when the rule is sent to Congress
prior to enactment. 20 9 This further supports the argument in favor of courts
regularly using the Advisory Committee's notes as a guide when
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. How TO INTERPRET FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(b)(2)

Part II.A of this Note discusses the advantages of applying the modem
textualist approach to the statutory interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Part II.B addresses the advantages of applying the
purposive approach and of using the Advisory Committee's notes in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. A Plain-MeaningApproach to the Interpretationof the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure: Arguments in Favor of Following the CurrentPlainMeaning Approach to Statutory Interpretationof the Rules
The primacy of the text is one of the most compelling arguments in favor
of applying a plain-meaning approach to interpretation. 210 The words that
comprise a particular statute represent the actual act itself.2 11 "Congress
legislates by statements, not by force of will. ' 2 12 Therefore, the intent or

purpose of Congress in passing a law does not have the same importance as
the text of the statute. Rather, it is the actual text or statement that is issued
by Congress that carries with it the force of law. 2 13 Thus, while the

207. See id. at 1112-13 (stating that "the Advisory Committee currently uses the Notes to
indicate [a Rule's] purpose, guide future interpretations," and "inform the rulemaking
process itself'). The Advisory Committee's notes are included with the proposed rule to
explain its "purpose and intent." Id. at 1113.
208. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. Professor Struve further argues that, due
to the nature of the Advisory Committee's notes, they should be given "authoritative effect"
by courts. Struve, supra note 111, at 1152.
209. Struve, supra note 111, at 1113-14, 1152 (arguing that, as a result of this process, the
"Advisory Committee's Notes possess distinctive claims to authority"). Compare id., with
Moore, supra note 80, at 1094. According to Professor Struve, Professor Moore argues that
"the dispositive interpretive consideration should be.. . [the] Court's own understanding of
the Rule," not the Advisory Committee's notes. Struve, supra note 111, at 1152.
210. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 621 (stating that "[tihe statute's text is the most
important consideration in statutory interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given
effect.").
211. See Sinclair, supra note 85, at 155-56 (stating that the primary focus of statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute, as it is the language of the statute that constitutes
the act being legislated by Congress).
212. Id. at 155. "Congress speaks only by enacting statutes," and no other words, except
the Constitution, have the force of law in the United States. Id.
213. Id. at 155-56. As only the language of the statute has the force of law, the
"[legislative history is not law and cannot change the meaning of a statute." Id. at 156.
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legislative history to a statute might provide persuasive guidance if a statute
2 14
is unclear, only the text of the statute itself has the force of law behind it.
Accordingly, and in line with the plain-meaning approach, "[w]here the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion. '2 15 An equally strong analogous argument
can be made with regards to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the
2 16
text of the Rules is also of prime importance in interpreting the Rules.
The unreliability of extrinsic sources, especially legislative history, has
often been an important justification for the plain-meaning approach to
statutory interpretation. 2 17 Recently, in Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services,
Justice Kennedy discussed some of the major criticisms of relying on
legislative history.
First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and
contradictory. Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency
to become ...an exercise in looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends. Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee
reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of [Article I
of the U.S. Constitution], may give unrepresentative committee
members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists-both the
power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative
history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory
text. 2 18
While the Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules would
generally not be nearly as "murky" or "ambiguous" as legislative history,
the Advisory Committee's notes are still extrinsic sources and may be
subject to some of the same criticisms as legislative history. 2 19 One
example of the Advisory Committee's notes being ambiguous and failing to
214. Id. at 155-56. While legislative history and other extrinsic sources do not have the
force of law, they can be helpful to a decision maker, especially the judiciary, without
compromising the primacy of the text. Id. at 156.
215. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). The Court in Caminetti
further stated that in the course of interpretation, statutory words are presumed as having the
meaning commonly attributed to them. Id.at 485-86.
216. See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
217. Sinclair, supra note 85, at 162 ("[T]he argument is that legislative history is less
clear, more vague, more subject to different interpretation, than the statute."). Sinclair refers
to this characteristic as a "[f]ack of [u]tility" with regard to legislative history as it is not
consistently useful. Id. For further discussion, compare Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation 32 (1997) (arguing that legislative history "is much more likely to produce a
false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one"), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses
of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.Cal. L. Rev. 845, 862 (1992) (arguing
that while it is not necessarily always helpful, legislative history is sometimes helpful).
218. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted).
219. One example of this arises in the situation when the Advisory Committee's notes are
irreconcilable with the text of a rule. In such a case, as with all extrinsic sources, the text of
the rule will always prevail over any interpretative sources. See Struve, supra note 111, at
1169.
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thoroughly illustrate the purpose of the Federal Rules is the note to Rule 23.
Although the note to Rule 23 provide explanations for many aspects of the
Rule and therefore aid in its interpretation, the note to subdivision (b)(2)
fails to resolve all issues of interpretation. 220 While the note implies that
monetary damages are permissible under this provision, the note fails to
provide any standard or other guidance for courts to determine whether
monetary damages are appropriate in individual suits. 2 21 As a result, there
has been a copious amount of litigation and the current circuit split between
the Fifth and Second Circuits regarding the interpretation of this
222
provision.
Another main argument in favor of a modem plain-meaning or textualist
approach to statutory interpretation involves the process by which statutes
are enacted. The Constitution provides that in order for a bill to become
law, it must be passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the
President for approval. 223 While statutes are required to endure this
process, legislative history, on the other hand, is not. This disparity has led
Justice Scalia to criticize courts for relying on legislative history in
interpretation. 224 Even though this argument does not directly apply to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Federal Rules are enacted in a
significantly different manner than statutes, 225 an analogy can be drawn to
the Advisory Committee's notes. While the text of a rule undergoes many
revisions throughout the rulemaking process, the Advisory Committee's
notes accompany the first draft of the rule and do not necessarily undergo

220. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the circuit split between the Fifth Circuit and the
Second Circuit over the interpretation of the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 23(b)(2)).
221. The Advisory Committee's note simply states that 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money
damages." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
222. See supra Part I.A.3.
223. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Article I of the Constitution grants exclusive legislative
powers to Congress and also sets forth the process whereby statutes are passed, involving
approval by both Houses of Congress (bicameralism) and approval by the President
(presentment). Id. §§ 1, 7, cl. 2; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983)
(describing the legislative process).
224. Sinclair, supra note 85, at 156-57 (referring to Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J.,concurring), in which Justice
Scalia "railed" against the majority's reliance on Congressional Committee Reports, which
are prepared by staff members (who are not vested with the lawmaking powers provided to
Congress by the Constitution), rather than members of Congress); see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2815 (2006) (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("Worst of all is the Court's
reliance on the legislative history ... to buttress its implausible reading of [the statute at
issue]. We have repeatedly held that such reliance is impermissible where, as here, the
statutory language is unambiguous."); Scalia Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court's
Wittiest, Most Outspoken Justice 24-25 (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004). Scalia's objections to
Legislative history is "not usually ascertainable" as
legislative history are twofold:
individual "[m]embers of Congress usually have many different reasons (or no reason at all)
for voting for a bill," so there is no singular intent that can be attributed to a statute; and
intent, even if ascertainable, is an "illegitimate source of meaning." Id. at 25.
225. For an explanation of the process behind the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
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significant changes during the course of the process. 22 6 As a result, it can
be argued that they are not as careful and thorough as the text of the rule
227
and therefore, should not be given nearly the same weight as the text.
This argument, while not as strong when applied to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, does serve to encourage hesitation when courts rely
exclusively on the notes to a rule, especially if the notes are not supported
228
by the text of the rule.
B. A PurposiveApproach to the Interpretationof the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure: Arguments in Favor of Using the Advisory Committee's Notes
to Interpret the Rules
Others argue that the Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules
are distinct from legislative history and other extrinsic sources in a number
of significant ways, and, therefore, that the notes should be used to guide
courts in interpreting Federal Rules regardless of the ambiguity of the
text. 229 In particular, the process behind the creation of the Federal Rules,
the nature of the Advisory Committee's notes, and some other distinctive
features of the notes, indicate that the notes should be used more regularly
than extrinsic statutory sources.
1. The Creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of disparate treatment for
the use of the Advisory Committee's notes in comparison to legislative
history is the unique process behind the creation of the Federal Rules.2 30
Specifically, due to the rulemaking process, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be interpreted in such a way as to give the judiciary a
great deal of discretion. Unlike statutes, which constitutionally must go
through both houses of Congress and be presented to the President for
approval, 2 31 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated under the

226. The Advisory Committee's note to a proposed rule, or amendment to a rule, is
drafted at the same time as the rule and may undergo changes throughout the rulemaking
process. See Struve, supra note 111, at 1111-12. While the text of the proposed rule
undergoes alterations throughout the seven stages, revisions to the note do not seem to be
nearly as carefully drafted. See id. at 1103-04 (discussing the rulemaking process for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
227. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1093-94 (stating that while courts "should not be bound
by the expressions regarding purpose or policy by the lower bodies,... [they] should
certainly be informed by those expressions").
228. See id.; see also supra note 219.
229. See Struve, supra note 111, at 1169 ("[A] court interpreting a Rule should always
consult the Note as well as the text and should attempt to construe the text and Note so that
they are consistent. Where the text and Note are irreconcilable, the text should trump the
Note; but otherwise, the Note should be given binding effect.").
230. See generallysupra Part I.D. 1.
231. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.

2006]

CLASS ACTIONS AND MONETARYDAMAGES

supervision of the judicial branch. 232 Since the Federal Rules are crafted
under the direct supervision of the judicial branch and are approved by the
Supreme Court, 233 the judiciary should be allowed a great deal of discretion
in its interpretation of the Rules.
2. The Distinct Nature of the Advisory Committee's Notes
The nature of the Advisory Committee's notes themselves also supports
the argument that the notes should be consulted regularly, as opposed to
only when the text is found to be ambiguous. 234 While consulting
legislative history is difficult and controversial 23 5 because of the uncertainty
of determining legislative intent, the Advisory Committee's notes lack these
difficulties. In addition to accompanying the Federal Rules through every
stage of development, 236 the notes are drafted by the same committee that
drafts the text of the Rules; 237 therefore, consulting the Advisory
Committee's notes does not involve nearly as much uncertainty as there is
with legislative history. The Advisory Committee intends the notes to serve
as a guide for courts attempting to interpret the Rules. 238 As a result, there
is a strong argument based on the unique nature of the Advisory
Committee's notes, as well as the rulemaking process, that would suggest a
purposive or intentionalist view is appropriate for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as the drafters' intent is a great deal more ascertainable than in
239
the context of statutory interpretation.
3. Other Considerations that Encourage the Use of the Purposive Approach
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Some other considerations that should be taken into account when
addressing the interpretation of Federal Rules include the issues of
separation of powers and drafting errors. 240 Although separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government is
an important issue with regards to statutory interpretation, 24 1 this concern is
232. In 1934, the legislature passed the Rules Enabling Act, which delegated the power to
make the Rules to the Supreme Court. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 194, 196-200 and accompanying text.
234. See generally supra Part I.D.2.
235. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
240. See Sinclair, supra note 85, at 157-59, 167-68, for a discussion of the issues of
separation of powers and drafting errors in statutory interpretation.
241. See Struve, supra note 111, at 1100 (stating that "[d]istinctions between the
functions of the legislative and judicial branches are a staple of debates over statutory
interpretation," and that, for some, courts should implement a statute's text, regardless of the
court's policies, since federal judges play no role in the legislative process); see also
Sinclair, supra note 85, at 156-58. The Constitution establishes "how statutes are to be
enacted and who may enact them," and grants lawmaking power only to the legislative
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less implicated with respect to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 242 In
the case of statutory interpretation, there is often a clash between the
judicial and legislative branches. 24 3 As a result, courts are often reluctant to
use a great amount of discretion when interpreting statutes and try to give
deference to the legislative text.244 While the legislative branch is
somewhat involved with the promulgation of the Federal Rules, the Rules
are actually crafted under the supervision of the judicial branch, 24 5 and,
therefore, the judiciary plays an active role in their formulation. Thus, there
is not as controversial an issue of separation of powers with the Federal
Rules. 246 This implies that judges should be given more latitude to interpret
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than they are given with regards to
247
statutory interpretation.
An additional argument in favor of purposive interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves simple errors that, under the
plain-meaning rule, may alter the intended interpretation of a text. 24 8 While
it is unlikely that even the staunchest textualist would be unwilling to look
to extrinsic sources in the case of obvious errors in the text, 24 9 it is also
possible that an error would go undiscovered if a court does not examine
extrinsic sources. 250 In those cases, a court applying the plain-meaning rule
may interpret the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent of the drafters, while a court applying the
purposive or intentional approach would provide an interpretation that is in
25 1
accordance with the drafters' intent.
branch, not the judiciary. Id. at 156. Additionally, free access to extrinsic resources by the
judiciary can be viewed as undermining legislative supremacy. See id. at 158-59.
242. The separation of powers issue is not nearly as great a concern with regards to the
Federal Rules for two main reasons. First, through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress
delegated rulemaking power to the Supreme Court. See supra notes 184-87 and
accompanying text. Also, since the Supreme Court directly oversees the promulgation of the
Rules, the Court does not need to be as deferential to its own texts as it is towards the
statutes enacted by the legislative branch. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
244. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1040, 1085.
245. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. Congress, through the "Report-andWait Requirement," has the ability to object to a proposed rule, but, if Congress fails to
object, the rule is enacted without any specific approval by Congress. Struve, supra note
111, at 1115.
246. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
247. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
248. See Sinclair, supra note 85, at 167-68. This discussion applies to "drafting errors
and other absurdities" such as an accidental omission of the word "not" in a text. Id. at 167.
249. Moore, supra note 80, at 1074-75 (stating that even Justice Scalia would permit
consultation of extrinsic sources when a literal interpretation of a text would "produce an
absurd result").
250. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 85, at 167-68. "Absurdities, oversights, and mistakes
are seldom so central and obvious. They are more likely to occur when the statute is applied
to an action clearly within its scope but in a way the legislature may not have intended." Id.
at 168. As a result, these errors may not be noticed until a specific, unanticipated situation
arises.
251. See generally id. at 167-68 (providing examples of drafting errors and absurdities
and the inconsistent interpretations that resulted from these errors).
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C. The Example of the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23(b)(2)
The current circuit split regarding whether monetary damages are
permissible in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) serves to illustrate
both the advantages and disadvantages of using the Advisory Committee's
notes to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Fifth and Second Circuits assume the use of the Advisory
Committee's notes in the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2). 252 At the same
time, however, the courts disagree as to the standard for determining when
monetary damages are permissible. 253 While helpful in some ways, the
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 23(b)(2) fails to shed any light on the
should use in determining the predominance of
standard that courts
254
monetary damages.
1. Advantages of the Use of the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
23(b)(2)
One advantage of the Advisory Committee's notes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is that, like legislative history, they can provide guidance
as to the purpose of a Rule.2 55 The note to Rule 23(b)(2) indicates that the
subsection was created primarily to enable plaintiffs in civil rights cases to
adjudicate their claims.2 56 This indication may assist courts in using their
judicial discretion in determining whether to certify a specific class under
Rule 23(b)(2). Additionally, while the text refers only to equitable relief,
the Advisory Committee's note to 23(b)(2) indicates that the subsection
"does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to money damages."2 57 Therefore, the note
damages would be
indicates that the drafters intended that some monetary
258
permissible for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
252. See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the circuit court split between the Fifth and
Second Circuits regarding the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2).
253. Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding

that monetary damages are only permissible when the monetary relief requested is wholly
incidental to the injunctive relief requested), with Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (supporting an "ad hoc" approach to determine whether

monetary damages predominate in a specific class action).
254. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for the text of the Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 23(b)(2).

255. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of
determining the purpose of a text with regards to statutory interpretation.
256. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23 advisory committee's note). This subsection also presumes that civil rights
discrimination often occurs on a class-wide basis, rather than only on an individual basis,
thereby making class actions appropriate for civil rights cases. See Stamps, supra note 4, at
415 ("When one individual from a protected class has been discriminated against, similar
discrimination against other individuals from that same, or another, protected class
frequently occurs.").

257. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
258. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that "[t]he advisory committee's note to Rule 23 contemplates (b)(2) class
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2. Disadvantages of Using the Advisory Committee's Note to 23(b)(2)
At the same time, however, the Advisory Committee's note to Rule
23(b)(2) also demonstrates one of the major disadvantages of reliance on
sources extrinsic to the text of the Rule-uncertainty. As Justice Kennedy
explained with respect to legislative history, extrinsic sources are often
"murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. '259 Here, while the note indicates
that some monetary damages are permissible, two problems are created as a
result of the text. First, the note can be seen as contradictory to the text of
the Rule, which only seems to permit injunctive or declaratory relief.260
Additionally, the Advisory Committee's note fails to further specify a
standard that should be used to determine when monetary damages are
permissible, or guide courts as to what is an appropriate balance between
monetary and equitable relief.26 1 The note's silence resulted in a
widespread split among courts, most noticeably between the Fifth Circuit in
Allison and the Second Circuit in Robinson, which have developed distinct
standards in determining whether monetary damages predominate in a
262
request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).
D. Application to Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions
1. Plain-Meaning Approach
Following the plain-meaning approach, the Supreme Court could well
construe Rule 23(b)(2) not to permit monetary damages for classes certified
under this provision, as, by its terms, the Rule does not specifically allow
for monetary damages in addition to the injunctive or declaratory relief that
is requested. 263 If a court considers the Rule's silence to be ambiguous, it
certification of at least some claims for monetary recovery"); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974). In Pettway, the court stated that "the language [of
Rule 23(b)(2)], 'final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 'appropriate,'
describes the situation in which a class can be recognized, as one in which this type of relief
is appropriate. 494 F.2d at 257 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)). The Pettway court went
on to state that "[t]his is not to be read as saying 'thereby making appropriate only final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief.' All that need be determined is that
conduct of the party opposing the class is such as makes such equitable relief appropriate."
Id.
259. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005).
260. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). This argument is strengthened when the text of 23(b)(2) is
examined in light of the rest of Rule 23(b)'s provisions, as subsections (1) and (3) both
specifically refer to monetary damages as appropriate forms of relief for classes certified
under these provisions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (3).
261. Striking this balance is especially difficult in this case, as it is very difficult to
compare the value of equitable relief to that of monetary damages. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
262. See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the circuit split between Allison and
Robinson.
263. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the language of Rule 23(b)(2); see also
Dasteel & McKraig, supra note 33, at 1883 (opining that "any form of money damages as
part of a (b)(2) class is inconsistent with Rule 23's analytical framework").
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would look to the Advisory Committee's notes for guidance. 264 If so,
courts would return to the same discussion of "predominance" exemplified
by the circuit split between Allison and Robinson.2 65 However, because the
Supreme Court rarely finds statutory text to be ambiguous, 266 Rule 23(b)(2)
might well be interpreted in such a way as to preclude any monetary
267
damages in class actions certified under this provision.
Even if the text were held unambiguous, courts could, consistent with the
current plain-meaning approach to interpretation, look to the context of the
rest of Rule 23 to interpret 23(b)(2). 268 Looking to the context of the Rule
could yield another interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2), which would involve
severing the monetary relief claims from the injunctive or declaratory relief,
and certifying a damages class as well. 269 In examining the text of the Rule
as a whole and focusing on the provision of Rule 23(b), both 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(3) provide for monetary relief for class actions, while 23(b)(2) only
provides for injunctive or declaratory relief.270 This might imply that class
actions brought under 23(b)(2) are intended to serve a different sort of relief
from those brought under other provisions of the Rule, especially as a type
of group relief from discrimination suffered by the group as a whole. 2 71 As
monetary damages are not generally considered to be a type of group

264. There is no standard for when a court will find statutory text ambiguous. However,
courts have relied on the canons of construction, a series of "rules, maxims, or homilies"
used by courts to "determine whether a statute is ambiguous, and to resolve the ambiguity."
Mamnen, supra note 80, at 25-26 (discussing the use of canons of construction in statutory
interpretation).
265. See supra Part I.A.3.
266. See Moore, supra note 80, at 1073-74 (arguing that "[p]lain meaning adherents often
find that statutory language is clear, even when others argue that the same statutory language
is ambiguous"). As a result of the apparent lack of ambiguity in statutes under the plainmeaning approach, legislative intent or history is rarely explored, except in cases when
"blind adherence to the plain meaning" would "produce an absurd result." Id. at 1074-75.
267. This interpretation would likely result in a class action being certified under Rule
23(b)(2) only for the claims for equitable relief, with the claims for monetary damages being
litigated in a "damages" class action under Rule 23(b)(3) or on an individual basis if a (b)(3)
class is inappropriate. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. One scholar has also
proposed that, for class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) that involve the request for both
monetary and equitable relief, a 23(b)(2) class action be certified to settle the question of
liability and establish res judicata, while the "remedial stage" where individual damages are
determined, be litigated on an individual basis. See Changelo, supra note 4, at 159.
268. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 669 and Part I.B.l.a for a discussion of the modem
plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation.
269. The severing of the claims into multiple class actions is permissible under Rule
23(c)(4)(A). See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
270. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
271. See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1974)
("Subdivision (b)(2) is keyed to the effect of the relief sought, and the pragmatic
ramifications of adjudication in each situation, rather than any special attributes of the class
involved." (internal quotations omitted)). For an analogous situation with regards to
statutory interpretation, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987), where the
Court held that, within a statute, if particular language is included in one section and absent
from another, then it is presumed that the exclusion was deliberate and intentional.
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relief,272 then courts may interpret the provision, using the plain-meaning
approach, to require only injunctive or declaratory relief for the group, with
monetary damages to be litigated separately. The claims for monetary relief
can be individually litigated or else the class members can also seek
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to litigate the monetary damages arising
from the original claim. 273 Additionally, under the current Rule 23(c)(4),
the class can be divided into subclasses, and each subclass treated as a class
action in itself, and therefore governed by the other provisions of Rule
23.274 Under this provision, the relief would likely be split into two
separate class actions: one action for injunctive or declaratory relief under
23(b)(2), and, if appropriate, a class action for monetary damages under
23(b)(3).
2. Purposive Approach
Using a purposive approach, where the intent of the drafters is the
primary focus of interpretation, Rule 23(b)(2) would encompass at least
some form of monetary damages. Monetary damages would be permissible
under this approach because the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 23,
which often indicates the intent of the drafters, simply states that injunctive
or declaratory relief must predominate in any class action certified under
the Rule, 275 thereby not precluding monetary damages in the request for
relief. Therefore, by implication, under this approach, the relief requested
in 23(b)(2) class actions need not be exclusively injunctive or declaratory
relief, and there would be no need to split a class action or sever certain
parts of the litigation when both monetary and injunctive relief are
2 76
requested.
Even though some form of monetary damages would likely be
permissible under this approach, the standard of how to determine whether
the monetary damages predominate over the injunctive or declaratory relief

272. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that

"[tihe very nature of [compensatory] damages, compensating plaintiffs for emotional and
other intangible injuries, necessarily implicates the subjective differences of each plaintiff's
circumstances; they are an individual, not class-wide, remedy"); see also Robinson v. MetroNorth Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001) (referring to the district
court's opinion that the liability phase involving monetary damages would require an
individualized determination of damages due to each class member).
273. See supra note 68.

274. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (stating that "[wihen appropriate (A) an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may
be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly").
275. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
276. This interpretation is in accord with the text of the Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 23(b)(2) and also with the purpose of the Rule as stated in the Advisory Committee's
note, which is to enable plaintiffs in civil rights cases to adjudicate their claims. See id.
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requested must still be decided. 277 Therefore, while it is the current practice
of the majority of courts to allow for some form of monetary damages in
class actions seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2), the circuit split
between the Fifth Circuit in Allison and the Second Circuit in Robinson
must be resolved regarding the standard used in deciding when monetary
damages are appropriate.
III. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET RULE 23(b)(2) USING A PURPOSIVE
APPROACH

Part III.A argues that the appropriate resolution to the conflict between
the theories of interpretation is a purposive interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which would require courts to consistently
consider the Advisory Committee's notes to the Rules as a guide to
interpretation. Finally, Part III.B applies this method of interpretation to
Rule 23(b)(2) and argues that classes certified under this Rule should be
permitted to bring claims for both injunctive and monetary relief, provided
that the injunctive relief is not used only as a tool for enabling the
maintenance of a class action for monetary damages.
A. FederalRules of Civil ProcedureShould Be Interpreted Using a
PurposiveApproach to Interpretation
While there are a number of compelling reasons to interpret the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure under the plain-meaning approach of statutory
interpretation, many of the reasons for applying the plain-meaning approach
to statutes do not apply to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Additionally, in the interest of public policy, 27 8 and in line with current
court practices, a purposive approach that encompasses regular use of the
Advisory Committee's notes is appropriate when interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
While the primacy of the text of the Rules is a strong reason in favor of
applying the plain-meaning approach, 279 using a purposive approach does
not diminish the importance of the text, as the text is still the primary source
examined. 280 Even under the purposive approach, the first step in
interpreting a rule would be to attempt to determine the meaning of the
text. 28 1 Therefore, the primacy of the text is preserved under the purposive

277. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the circuit court split between the Fifth Circuit and
the Second Circuit over the standard to be used when determining whether monetary
damages predominate).
278. See, e.g., Eble, supra note 18, § 20.1 (listing a number of cases, including In re
Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), which have held that "Rule 23(b)
should be applied with a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation" because "important
public policy benefits arise from class action certification in an appropriate case").
279. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
281. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 624.
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approach to interpretation. 2 82 The contrast between the purposive approach
and the plain-meaning approach regarding the importance of the text,
however, is that the purposive approach allows and encourages further
examination of the context and extrinsic sources to the rule in order to
2 83
determine the purpose of the rule.
Another issue that is imperative with regards to statutory interpretation
that does not play as significant a role with regards to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is the issue of separation of powers. 284 As discussed above,
while the Supreme Court may be hesitant to take too active a role in
attempting to discern legislative intent, 285 this should not be the case the
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 286 Since the Court plays a
significant role in the creation of the Federal Rules, this hesitation to step
287
on the toes of another branch of government would not apply in this case.
Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to actively seek to interpret Federal
Rules in accordance with their purpose, which supports using the Advisory
Committee's notes regularly, regardless of whether there is ambiguity in the
2 88
text.
B. Rule 23(b)(2) Should Be Interpreted Using a PurposiveApproach to
Interpretation,with ConsistentReliance on the Advisory Committee's Notes
Rule 23(b)(2), in addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
general, should be interpreted by courts to reflect a purposive approach to
interpretation. This would encourage courts to consult the Advisory
Committee's note to the Rule, as the note indicates the purpose or intent of
the Advisory Committee in drafting the Rule.
While Rule 23(b)(2) fails to address the permissibility of monetary
damages in class actions certified under this section, the Advisory
Committee's note specifically provides for this possibility. 289
Additionally, examination of the Advisory Committee's note indicates
that the purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) is to enable plaintiffs in "various actions
in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating
unlawfully against a class" to litigate their claims. 290 As a result, under the

282. See id. at 625.

283. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 223, 240-41 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
286. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ateIllustration of the Supreme
Court's Role as Interpreterof the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,63 Notre Dame L. Rev.

720, 720 (1988) (arguing that because the Supreme Court promulgates the Rules, "federal
courts are fully justified in taking an expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny,
giving it a liberal reading if that is required to fulfill the purposes of the Rule"); Moore,
supra note 80, at 1093 ("Given [the] substantial ... powers of the Court in the promulgation
process, a more activist role in the interpretive stage... is appropriate.").
287. Bauer, supra note 286, at 720.
288. See id. at 723.

289. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
290. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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purposive approach, courts should use their judicial discretion to encourage
the certification of classes in cases where both monetary and injunctive or
29 1
declaratory relief are appropriate, especially in civil-rights class actions.
C. Rule 23(b)(2) Should Be Interpretedin Accordance with the Standard
Set by the Second Circuit in Robinson
Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are unique when compared
with those brought under 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(3). While 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3)
allow for classes to seek monetary damages for wrongs against the entire
class of litigants, only 23(b)(2) allows for injunctive or declaratory relief to
be sought. 292 Therefore, it is important to encourage litigants to bring
claims under this Rule, 293 as classes are often primarily looking for the
wrong that has been committed against the class to be corrected for the
future, with any monetary damages received being largely incidental to the
injunctive relief requested. If many obstacles are placed in the way of class
actions being brought under Rule 23(b)(2), then it will be increasingly
unlikely that classes will seek injunctive relief, which may discourage
discriminatory practices from being corrected on a system-wide basis.
According to the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 23, Rule 23(b)(2)
was created mainly to allow plaintiffs in civil rights cases to adjudicate their
claims, where the primary relief sought is to reverse the effects of the classbased discrimination, a purpose well recognized in case law. 294 While the
injunctive or declaratory relief should be the most important relief requested
during the litigation, monetary damages should not be excluded simply
because they are not mentioned in the Rule. 2 95 Even though monetary
damages are not generally appropriate for a group remedy, there are
instances where this is possible. 296 One possible resolution to this issue is
that the class members can seek monetary damages in the form of a fund for
class members, where the amounts received by individual class members is
later determined either through individual litigation or a class action
brought under Rule 23(b)(1).297
291. The importance of judicial discretion is discussed extensively in Robinson v. MetroNorth Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2001), and Stamps, supra note 4,
at 436.
292. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
293. See Stamps, supra note 4, at 414-15 (stating that the 1991 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act, which increased protection for victims of discrimination, were intended to
"expand... the use of class actions to enforce civil rights").
294. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 advisory committee's note).
295. Using a strict plain-meaning approach, Rule 23(b)(2) can be interpreted to allow for
no monetary damages since the Rule only refers to injunctive or declaratory relief. See supra
notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
296. See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 163 (stating that even the Allison test allows for
compensatory damages in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in "those rare incidences in which the
request for monetary relief [is] wholly 'incidental' to the requested injunctive relief'
(quoting Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 197 F.R.D. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).
297. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
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The "bright-line rule," set up by the Fifth Circuit in Allison, which has
been characterized as virtually eliminating the ability of classes to seek any
substantial monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, 29 8 has been
called a "death knell" for class-action suits brought for discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 2 99 While the Allison standard restricts the
availability of class actions to litigants requesting injunctive or declaratory
relief, the Robinson test provides classes with a better opportunity to bring
their claims by requiring courts to examine the specific circumstances of the
claims to determine if the requested relief is appropriate. 30 0 Therefore,
Robinson works to preserve Rule 23(b)(2) class-action claims for monetary
relief, while Allison and its followers seem to close the door on these
litigants.
The Fifth Circuit and others that have adopted the Allison standard, by
severely limiting litigants' ability to bring the types of "hybrid" 30 1 class
actions under Rule 23(b)(2), properly prevent classes certified under Rule
23(b)(2) from bringing claims that are primarily for monetary damages
under the guise of some nominal injunctive or declaratory relief requested.
At the same time, however, the Allison standard may also greatly
discourage plaintiffs with meritorious claims from litigating their claims as
class-action suits, which is not in the interest of public policy. Even though
the ad hoc or "balancing" test created by the Second Circuit in Robinson
fails to provide a reliable standard for other courts to follow, the flexible
approach from Robinson is a great deal "more appealing to victims of
discrimination who want access to the class action device, '302 which
supports the public interest in protecting people's rights. Therefore, in the
interest of both the Advisory Committee's note, which indicates that Rule
23(b)(2) was intended to aid victims of civil-rights discrimination, and the
public policy of encouraging litigants to bring meritorious claims in class
actions, a more flexible approach to monetary damages, such as that set
forth in Robinson, should be adopted by courts.
CONCLUSION

The issue of whether monetary damages can accompany injunctive or
declaratory relief in class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) has important
implications for class-action litigation throughout the country. In many
cases, especially those involving civil rights, the opportunity to receive

298. Changelo, supra note 4, at 158.
299. See generally Nikaa Baugh Jordan, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum: The Death Knell for
the Title VII Class Action?, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 847 (2000) (analyzing the effect of the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Allison on class actions brought by victims of employment
discrimination); Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment DiscriminationClass
Actions Alive: How Allison v. Citgo's PredominationRequirement Threatens to Undermine

Title VII Enforcement, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 405 (2005).
300. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a description of hybrid class actions.
302. Changelo, supra note 4, at 158-59.

CLASS ACTIONS AND MONETARY DAMAGES

2006]

monetary damages in addition to injunctive or declaratory relief influences
whether a claim will be brought at all. 30 3 As a result, Rule 23(b)(2) should
be interpreted using an approach that encourages victims of discrimination
and other appropriate classes to bring class actions.
With this in mind, courts should interpret Rule 23(b)(2) using the
purposive approach, which would require courts to regularly consult the
Advisory Committee note to the Rule in order to understand its intended
purpose. 30 4 As the Second Circuit in Robinson30 5 best applies the
purposive approach to the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2), Robinson should
be the model for other courts to follow. 306 The Robinson court correctly
understood that the purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) is to provide a means of
redress for plaintiffs claming violations of their civil rights or other group307
wide injuries.
More broadly, the purposive approach should be applied to all Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As the primary extrinsic source to the Rules, the
Advisory Committee's notes are intended to guide courts in their
interpretation of the Rules; 30 8 they are an appropriate and reliable source for
determining the drafter's intent 309 and should be consistently used by
10
courts.
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303. See supra Part III.C.
304. See supra Part II.B.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
See supra Part I.A.3.b.
See supra notes 17-18, 256 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202, 207 and accompanying text.

309. See supra Part II.B.2.
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